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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: INTERVENTION OF RIGHT
GRANTED PRIVATE PARTY IN GOVERNMENT
ANTITRUST SUIT UNDER NEW RULE 24 (a) (2)
Recent revisions of rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
removed certain restrictive interpretations which had been en-
grafted upon the old form. New rule 24(a)(2) states that a party
may intervene of'right in an action when he possesses an interest
which may be substantially impaired by a determination in the
proceeding, and he is not adequately represented by an existing
party. In the first Supreme Court application of thi-new rule,
the Court intimated that even in an antitrust context a pecuniary
or possessory interest is not required for intervention. The Court
failed, however, to delineate the representation requirement and
the case may be of limited precedential value because of the clear
nature of the government misconduct involved.
UNDER Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (a) intervention as a
matter of right is permitted in certain circumstances. 1 In the recent
antitrust case of Cascade Natural Gas Corporation v. El Paso Natural
Gas Company,2 the United States Supreme Court has given an un-
precedented interpretation to old rule 24 (a) (3)3 and to the term
"interest" in its successor, new rule 24 (a) (2). 4 As a result of these
novel interpretations, private litigants were allowed to intervene as
a matter of right in the Government's suit to compel a divestiture of
illegally acquired assets.
In 1964 the United States Supreme Court in United States v. El
'Fo. R. Civ. P. 24 (a).
2586 U.S. 129 (1967).
"Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
•.. (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to the control or
disposition of the court or an officer thereof." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (3), 308 U.S. 691
(1939).
,'New rule 24 (a) (2) reads: "Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by exist-
ing parties." FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2) (effective July 1, 1966).
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Paso Natural Gas Company5 held that the acquisition of the Pacific
Northwest Pipeline Corporation by the El Paso Natural Gas Com-
pany violated section 7 of the Clayton Act and ordered a divestiture
"without delay."7 Prior to the formulation of the divestiture decree, a
score of applications to intervene as a matter of right under old rule
24 (a) were denied by the district court.8 Thereafter, the district
court announced its divestiture decree.9 Meanwhile, the State of
California, Southern California Edison, and Cascade Natural Gas
Corporation appealed the denial of their intervention motions. The
United States Supreme Court held that the State of California and
Southern California Edison were "'so situated' geographically as to
be 'adversely affected' within the meaning of old Rule 24 (a) (3)."1 0
Moreover, recognizing that the action had to be opened to allow the
State of California and Southern California Edison to intervene, the
Court concluded that new rule 24 (a) (2), effective subsequent to the
district court's denial, was "broad enough to include Cascade [since
the] . . . 'existing parties' [had] fallen far short of representing its
interests." '" Finding the divestiture decree unsatisfactory, 12 the
majority took the extraordinary action of enunciating explicit guide-
lines pursuant to which it desired the new decree formulated.'8
Finally, a new district judge was to be assigned to the case since the
attitude of the presiding district judge was primarily responsible for
"the evil" which permeated the divestiture decree.' 4
376 U.S. 651 (1964).6 Id. at 662.
7 Id.
8 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 37 F.R.D. 330 (D. Utah 1965). Intervcn-
tion was opposed by both the United States and El Paso. Id. at 332. There were
twenty potential intervenors including the public utilities commissions of seven states,
the State of California, eleven natural gas distributing companies, and a would-be
purchaser. Id.
9 1965 Trade Cas. 80,985 (D. Utah).
10 Cascade Natural Gas. Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 135 (1967).
11 Id. at 136.
12Id
2S Id. at 136-43. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part to
the first El Paso case, stated that he knew of no decision in which the Court had initi-
ally directed a divestiture or any other relief. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 376 U.S. 651, 664 (1964). In the instant case, Mr. Justice Stewart observed that
the issues relevant to a divestiture decree had never been submitted to the adversary
process and that the proper remedy, assuming the majority's position on intervention
was correct, was to remand the case for further hearings upon the divestiture decree.
386 U.S. at 159 (dissenting opinion).
21 The district judge approved a plan which provided for a division of the gas
supplies to avoid the necessity of creating dual pipelines and storage facilities. The
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Old rule 24 (a), drafted in 1938, was a codification of the then
existing federal practice relating to intervention.15 That practice
has its historical antecedents in the English Chancery procedure of
petitioning pro interessee suo.16 By such a petition, a non-party who
claimed an interest in the property under the court's dominion was
permitted to enter a pending suit and assert his interest. In 1912
the United States Supreme Court, pursuant to a comprehensive re-
vision of its equity rules, adopted Equity Rule 3717 which reflected
this "property" concept. Similarly, admiralty practice recognized
absolute intervention where a claimant asserted an interest in the
proceeds of a fund under the control of an admiralty court.', When
the Advisory Committee drafted the first Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, this principle was incorporated in rule 24 (a) (3).19 Old
rule 24 (a) (2), in an attempt to provide an alternative basis for inter-
vention, allowed intervention as a matter of right when "the repre-
sentation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be
inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in
the action."20
New rule 24 (a) (2) was drafted to rectify certain difficulties which
arose in the application of former rule 24 (a) (2) and (3).21 The old
subsection (3) requirement of a fund or property in the possession
Supreme Court, however, desired duplication of facilities in order to promote competi-
tion between El Paso and the new company. 386 U.S. at 142-43.
'r Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 144 n.2
(1967) (dissenting opinion).16 See 2 T. STaRM, FEDERAL EQuITY PRACTCE § 1365 (1909).
27Equity R. 37, 226 U.S. 659 (1912).
8 See The Charles D. Leffler, 100 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1938).
10 See generally D. LouxsELL& & G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE 750 (1962); Moore & Levi, Federal Intervention: I. The Right to Intervene
and Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565 (1936) (research paper upon which rule 24 was
based).
2 0 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), 308 U.S. 690 (1939). In Sam Fox Publishing Co. v.
United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961), the Court interpreted "bound" in terms of the
concept of res judicata, which had the effect of making former rule 24 (a) (2) a nullity
in class actions. A member of a class against whom a prior class judgment was sought
to be enforced could avoid liability by showing that he was inadequately represented.
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-46 (1940). See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs
§ 72, at 268 (1963). Thus, if the intervenor's representation was in fact inadequate, the
judgment would not be res judicata as to him and he would not be entitled to inter-
vene. Conversely, if the judgment would have res judicata effect, the applicant would
have no right to intervene since his representation was, by definition, adequate. See
generally C. WRIGHT, supra at 284; Comment, Intervention of Right in Class Actions:
The Dilemma of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(aX2), 50 CALIF. L. Rv. 89 (1962).
21 See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 109, 109-10 (1966). See generally Cohn,
The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 Gao. L.J. 1204 (1966).
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of the court was unduly restrictive.22 Thus, new rule 24 (a) (2) per-
mits intervention when the action will substantially affect some
"interest" of the applicant, regardless of the existence of a fund.23
The present rule also omits the "bound" phraseology of old subsec-
tion (2) and permits non-discretionary intervention when the appli-
cant "is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect"24 his inter-
est, unless such interest is adequately represented by the existing
parties.2 5
Though the new provision embodies the principles of the old
rules without the objectionable res judicata and "fund" concepts,
the current form still requires an "interest," as well as inadequate
representation, before the absolute right to intervene is recognized.
Due to the amendment of rule 24 (a), it would be of limited value
to explore the intervention granted to the State of California and
Southern California Edison under former subsection (3). Hence,
attention will be focused upon new rule 24 (a) (2) under which the
Court permitted Cascade, a private distributor of gas, to participate in
the litigation.
Under former rule 24 (a) (3) the applicant was generally required
to possess an interest recognized and protected by the law, such as a
lien or claim of ownership, either equitable or legal, before a non-
discretionary right to intervene was acknowledged.20  Such an abso-
lute right has been recognized upon assertion of a claim to attached
22 To avoid the technical requirement of a fund, some courts gave a liberal interpre-
tation to the concept. See Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir.
1960); D. LOuisELL & G. HAZAR, supra note 19, at 750. As a consequence, it has been
stated that: "The concept of a fund has been applied so loosely that it is possible
for a court to find a fund in almost any in personam action." 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACriCE 24.09[3], at 55 (2d ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as MooRE].
23 See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 109 (1966).
2
'FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2). The language of this section is comparable to that of
FED. R. Crv. P. 19 (a) (2) (i), which provides for joinder of a party when: "(2) lie claims
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition
of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest .... "
21 See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 110 (1966).
20 Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 88 F. Supp. 115, 119
(E.D.N.C.), aff'd sub nom. Rose v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 181 F.2d 944 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950); First State Bank v. Citizens State Bank, 10 F.R.D.
424, 426 (D. Neb. 1950); Gross v. Missouri & Ark. Ry., 74 F. Supp. 242, 249 (W.D. Ark.
1947); United States v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 116, 120 (D. Del.),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 108 F.2d
614 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 687 (1940); see 4 MooRE 24.09[2], at 45; 6
H. Tor.Mm., ANri-TausT LAws § 6.7, at 208 (1951).
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property or its proceeds,27 part ownership of a chattel mortgage,28 a
mortgage lien on a leasehold interest subject to forfeiture,29 and the
claim of a purchaser of land involved in foreclosure proceedings
against the seller.30  Courts have realized that it is "not always easy
to draw the line,"31 but have in close cases been guided by the his-
torical policies behind intervention as a matter of right, and thus
generally have adopted a legal interpretation of "interest." 32
Consequently, in a long series of precedents both before and
after the adoption of rule 24 (a), intervention as a matter of right has
been consistently refused to persons claiming to represent some
general public interest in suits where a public authority is already
representing that interest.33 This principle was related to the anti-
trust field in Ex parte Leaf Tobacco Board of Trad3 4 where the
27 Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 283-87 (1883).
28 Osborne & Co. v. Barge, 30 F. 805 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1887).
2D See United States v. Radice, 40 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1930).
30 Gaines v. Clark, 275 F. 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1921).81Central Trust Co. v. Chicago R.I. & P.R.R., 218 F. 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1914); see
United States v. Radice, 40 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1930).
82 The receiver of a drainage district was not permitted to intervene in a suit against
the district for bonds which had been issued, the theory being that a receiver does not
represent the parties but is merely a custodian of the property. Board of Drainage
Comm'rs v. Lafayette Southside Bank, 27 F.2d 286, 295 (4th Cir. 1928).
11 A telephone subscriber was refused intervention in a suit between the city and
the telephone company over the city's rate ordinance and disposition of rate over-
charges. In re Engelhard & Sons, 231 U.S. 646 (1914). Depositors were denied inter-
vention under former rule 24 (a) (3) in proceedings by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board against savings and loan association officers. Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153, 159-60
(9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 915 (1965). Intervention under rule 24 (a) was
denied in a suit over mineral rights between the Government and a railroad to one
claiming the mineral rights under a patent from the United States. MacDonald v.
United States, 119 F.2d 821, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1941), modified sub nom. Great N. Ry.
v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942). A business injured by a utility's proposed dam
was not allowed intervention in a suit between the utility and the Federal Power
Commission. Radford Iron Co. v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 62 F.2d 940 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 289 U.S. 748 (1933). Participation was denied to a rate-payer protesting
a proposed settlement of litigation between a utility and a municipality. O'Connell
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 19 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1927). Intervention was denied to
over-represented towns in a reapportionment suit brought against state authorities.
Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754, 798-99 (D. Conn.), aff'd sub nom. Town of
Franklin v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 562 (1964) (per curiam). A similar refusal was
rendered to municipalities served by a railroad involved in a reorganization proceeding
to which the state was a party. Gross v. Missouri & A. Ry., 74 F. Supp. 242, 248-49
(W.D. Ark. 1947).
Professor Moore states that the real reason rate-payers and taxpayers are denied
intervention is because their interest is insufficient, rather than because it is adequately
represented. 4 MooRE 24.08, at 39-40. Professor Wright, on the other hand, con-
tends that inadequacy of representation is a factual question which in cases of doubt
should be resolved in the intervenor's favor. C. WRIGHT, supra note 20, § 75 at 283.
24222 U.S, 578 (1911) (per curiam).
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Court denied intervention to tobacco sellers in the Government's suit
to dissolve the American Tobacco combination. The subsequent re-
fusals of several other courts to allow applicants to participate in
government antitrust suits35 has led one commentator to state un-
equivocally that the only interest which will promote absolute inter-
vention is a legal interest.36
In addition to an "interest," new rule 24 (a) (2) requires that such
interest be inadequately represented,87 such as when the representa-
tive colludes with the adverse party,8 has some interest adverse to
that of the petitioner2 9 or fails to execute his responsibilities.0
According to one view, to allow absolute intervention in a govern-
ment antitrust action on the grounds of inadequate representation
would violate the legislative policy behind the antitrust statutes.41
Historically, two considerations have supported this position: first,
when the Government initiates an antitrust suit, it is deemed to be
acting in the public interest; 42 and secondly, effective vindication of
35 Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 14041 (1944);
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 186 F. Supp. 776
(E.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed sub noma. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
364 U.S. 518 (1960) (per curiam).
31 See 6 H. TOULMIN, supra note 26, § 6.7 at 208.
37 FE. R. Crv. P. 24 (a) (2). See note 4 supra.
3 Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 220 F.2d 247, 249 (9th Cir. 1955) (dic-
tum); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 988 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 761 (1947); Klein v. Nu-Way Shoe Co., 136 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1943); Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Jenkins, 7 F.R.D. 197, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
Pyle-National Co. v. Amos, 172 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1949); Mack v. Passaic Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 150 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd on rehearing, 154 F.2d 907 (3d Cir.
1946); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Keystone Freight Lines, Inc., 123 F.2d 326
(10th Cir. 1941); Galconda Petroleum Corp. v. Petrol Corp., 46 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.
Cal. 1942).
"°Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777 (1944)
(failure to prosecute an appeal); Turner v. Willard, 157 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(same); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 3
F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (same). See also Duncan v. National Tea Co., 14 111, App.
2d 280, 144 N.E.2d 771 (1957). In the latter case, intervention was allowed because of
the possibility of inadequacy of representation by the original plaintiff who failed to
prosecute her derivative stockholder's suit and sold her stock while the suit was still
pending. See generally Note, Shareholder Intervention in Corporate Litigation, 63
HAxv. L. Rx. 1426 (1950).
"2 6 H. TOULmN, supra note 26, § 6.9. The Clayton Act provides for a bifurcated
system of public and private enforcement. Compare Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25
(1964), with Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964). The public enforcement of anti-
trust laws is further divided since the responsibility is shared by the antitrust division
of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. See A. NEALE, Tin
ANTrrusT LAws oF THE U.S.A. 364 (1960); 32 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 135, 139-42 (1963).
2 See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 688-90 (1961); Buckeye
[Vol. 1968: 117
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the public injury requires continued and unfettered governmental
control over the suit.43 The Court has also recognized, however,
that the entrusting of such discretion to the Department of Justice
"includes the power to make erroneous decisions as well as correct
ones."
44
The majority in the instant decision attempted no definition of
Cascade's interest in the El Paso case, although the opinion details
the factual considerations relied upon by the competitor in its claim
for intervention. Hence, it appears that the majority adopted
Cascade's allegations as showing a sufficient interest under new rule
24 (a) (2). The distributor argued that an inequitable division of
gas reserves between the new company to be created and El Paso
would seriously jeopardize the potential of the new company to
function profitably. Since the new company would be Cascade's sole
supplier of natural gas, Cascade's own future performance would be
threatened.4: 5 Viewed in this manner, Cascade had a strong economic
interest in the asset distribution. Furthermore, it seems clear that
the intervenor's interest was not merely synonymous with the general
public interest in promoting effective competition within the state of
California.4 6 Left unspecified, however, was the legal claim of
ownership or lien which the dissenters contended was a prerequisite
to an absolute right to intervene.47
However, this contention assumes that the "interest" required in
new rule 24 (a) (2) is identical with the property-type interest required
under former rule 24 (a) (3). If this were the case, the standard for
intervention under the new rule would seemingly be more strict than
that formerly imposed. Under old rule 24 (a) (2), intervention of
right was granted when the applicant's interest may have been in-
adequately represented in the action and he may have been bound by
Coal & Ry. Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 269 U.S. 42, 48 (1925); Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834
(1963).
" See United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, 341 F.2d 1003, 1008 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1966).
11 Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331-32 (1928).
15 Cascade also alleged that the decree approved unfair contracts between El Paso
and the new company, imposed onerous price conditions upon the new company, and
improperly allowed the sale of stock by El Paso of a company formerly owned by
Pacific Northwest prior to the merger. These factors further implicated the competi-
tive ability of the new company. 386 U.S. at 133.
"I See note 67 infra and accompanying text.
17 386 U.S. at 147, 154.
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a judgment.48 The crucial determination involved the effect of the
judgment upon the applicant and not his direct interest in prop-
erty.4 9 Old rule 24 (a) (3), on the other hand, constituted an excep-
tion to the res judicata approach of 24 (a) (2). Where a fund or
property existed in the control of the court, intervention was granted
in the absence of res judicata possibilities because of the inherently
prejudicial effects of a judgment upon an applicant asserting a "legal"
claim such as ownership or a lien.50 Elimination of the "bound"
phraseology from new rule 24 (a) (2) should make it possible for the
courts to consider the practical effects of a decree upon the applicant
apart from technical res judicata concepts. Viewed in this manner,
cases considering the requirements of former rule 24 (a) (3) are easily
incorporated under the broad provisions of the new rule. If, however,
the new rule were interpreted as requiring a property interest similar
to that formerly necessary under 24 (a) (3), situations cognizable un-
der old subsection (2) would apparently be deleted from considera-
tion under the new rule. This result would be contrary to the pur-
poses motivating revision of the rule. It seems clear that under the
present rule 24 (a) (2) the courts should look primarily to the practical
consequences of a decree upon the applicant rather than minutely ex-
amining the applicant's "interest." 51 At any rate, a legal claim of
ownership or a lien should not be considered a prerequisite to inter-
vention under the new rule.
The liberalization of the interest requirement would seemingly
revitalize those cases arising under old rule 24 (a) (2) in which inter-
vention was granted to an applicant who possessed something less
than a "legal" interest and who would not have been "bound" by
any judgment in the action. These cases typically involved an inter-
venor who would have potentially suffered severe economic injury
and had no feasible alternative remedy for protecting his interest.52
48 See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
"See 4 MooRE 24.08, at 35, 37.
904 MooRE 24.08, at 35; id. 24.09, at 45.
' Examination of practical consequences is approved by the Advisory Committee. 4
MooRE 124.01, at 7 (Supp. 1967). The majority in El Paso quoted approvingly from
the Committee's notes and placed special emphasis upon that portion arguing for
intervention where an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical sense by
a determination in the action. 386 U.S. at 134 & n.3.
r
2 See, e.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 804 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros., 249 F.2d
22 (8th Cir. 1957); Textile Workers Union v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir.
1955).
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In such circumstances, the courts sometimes stretched the "bound"
concept by holding that the judgment would, as a practical matter,
possess a finality commensurate with that resulting from a strict
application of the res judicata doctrine.5 3 The similarity of the
rationale of these cases and that portion of new rule 24 (a) (2) dealing
with the practical inability of the applicant to protect his interest is
clear.
This liberalized conception of "interest" is broad enough to
encompass Cascade's situation within the El Paso context. The
formulation of any divestiture decree by the district court placed
Cascade's future gas supply in potential jeopardy.5 4 Furthermore,
if the company believed its interests to be threatened, the present
state of the law afforded no practical, available private remedies
which it might have utilized to alter any asset distribution ordered
by the court. Apparently, private parties may not sue under section
16 of the Clayton Act to require the divestiture of illegally-acquired
assets.55 A corollary of this doctrine denies a private litigant formal
means of altering a divestiture decree obtained by the Government
should it later appear ineffective in protecting the private party's
interests. A government divestiture decree, therefore, is final.and
conclusive as to a third party who may be significantly affected by the
division of assets. In summary, new rule 24 (a) (2) seems consistent
with a "consequential" view of interest; i.e., a party may be deemed
to have a sufficient interest in the litigation if the substantive resolu-
'" See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Interna-
tional Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1962).
" See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
55 Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964); see Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F.
Supp. 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Westor Theatres v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 41 F. Supp.
757, 763 (D.N.J. 1941). There is some indirect support for the proposition that private
parties may seek divestiture relief. See American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American
Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), afd on other grounds, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.
1958); National Supply Co. v. Hillman, 57 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Pa. 1944). See generally
Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a Remedy for Violation of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 MINN. L. Rav. 267 (1964). Even assuming that di-
vestiture is an available private remedy, a prior government-secured decree may practi-
cally foreclose effective private action. Divestiture is a harsh remedy, and its utiliza-
tion is dependent, to some extent, upon the speed with which the relief is sought;
i.e., the longer the time span between the merger and the court action, the more diffi-
cult divestiture becomes. See Comment, Divestiture of Illegally Held Assets, 64 Micrr.
L. REv. 1574, 1594, 1597 (1966). Hence, a private party would encounter substantial
difficulties in attempting to expand upon a prior government decree. Furthermore,
a court might, as a matter of comity, refuse to extend further relief. See Sam Fox
Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 694 (1961); Torquay Corp. v. Radio Corp.
of America, 2 F. Supp. 841, 843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
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tion of the basic controversy56 may, or does, expose it to potentially
adverse economic and procedural consequences.
Assuming this test is met, the requirement of inadequate repre-
sentation must still be considered. A potential intervenor may
argue that an existing party has failed adequately to represent goals
common to both parties.57 Alternatively, it may be contended that
even diligent pursuit by an existing party of its goals will not ade-
quately protect the would-be intervenor. Stated differently, the hope-
ful intervenor may wish to be considered a member of a class differ-
ent from any of the existing parties.58
The majority in El Paso apparently adopted the first approach
mentioned above, for its opinion assumed that Cascade's interest,
like that of the State of California, coincided with the "public"
interest, represented by the Government, of vindicating gas competi-
tion within California.5 9 Hence, inadequacy of representation could
11 The majority in El Paso spoke in terms of an interest which goes to the "heart
of the controversy." 386 U.S. at 135. This characterization may be helpful in ex-
cluding parties concerned with problems incidental or collateral to the basic issues of
the litigation. See United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432, 438 (C.D.
Cal. 1967) (collateral concern); cf. Torquay Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 2 F.
Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The definition is, however, difficult to apply and cannot
be confidently used in deciding close questions. It would seem preferable to place
greatest emphasis upon the potential intervenor's ability to utilize alternative means for
asserting his interest. Cf. 4 MooRE 24.08, at 37.
57 See, e.g., Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953); Wolpe v. Poretsky,
144 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777 (1944). When goals are determinative
of the representation requirement, a court must examine the conduct of the existing
party purportedly representing the would-be intervenor's interest. Hence, inadequate
representation under this standard can usually be shown only after the litigation has
been substantially completed. Cf. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 386 U.S. 129, 156 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
58 See First Congregational Church v. Evangelical & Reformed Church, 21 F.R.D.
325, 326-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); 4 MooRE 24.08, at 38. Where class is the basis for a
claim of inadequate representation, the court must compare the nature of the potential
intervenor's interest with that of the existing party. Since conduct is not in question,
this comparison can usually be made at an early stage in the proceedings. The dis.
parities between this approach to the representation requirement and the approach in-
dicated in note 57 supra would remain viable even if intervention were limited to the
remedial stages of litigation, or to the period after a consent decree has been filed with
the court. See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
51 See 386 U.S. at 136. The State of California was concerned with the restoration
of competition within the state. Id. at 135. Hence, its interest coincided with the
"public" interest necessarily represented by the Government's attempted procurement
of a divestiture decree which would effectively establish the new company as a com-
petitive factor within the state. Because of the coincidence of interests, the Court
properly conditioned a finding of inadequate representation upon a review of the
Government's conduct in the litigation. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
On the other hand, Cascade's interest in assuring itself an adequate present and future
gas supply seemingly cannot be equated with the interest promoted by the Govern-
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be determined only upon review of the Government's conduct in the
litigation.60 In this regard, the majority found that the Government
had "knuckled under" to El Paso by agreeing to an ineffective di-
vestiture decree in violation of a prior mandate from the Supreme
Court.6 '
Courts have consistently held that, within the context of antitrust
litigation, the Government is deemed to act in the public interest.
62
In the past, this doctrine has been equivalent to a conclusive pre-
sumption of adequacy. Occasional dictum, however, indicates that
this supposition may be overcome by a showing of bad faith or mal-
feasance on the part of the public litigator.6 3 Read narrowly, the
present case apparently establishes that government action incon-
sistent with a prior Court mandate is sufficient evidence of bad
faith. While the majority opinion does not explicitly establish this
type of government response as an exclusive test of bad faith, the
Court was careful to point out that it was not questioning the general
prerogative of the Justice Department to conduct and settle antitrust
controversies.6 4 Hence, it is quite possible that the present case will
be strictly limited to its facts insofar as the question of government
representation of the public interest in antitrust litigation is con-
cerned.6 5 El Paso will not, therefore, necessarily result in a dramatic
expansion of intervention by private parties in the public antitrust
area.
60
ment. A decree might effectively restore competition within California without en-
suring an adequate gas supply for Cascade. See note 67 infra and accompanying text.
Thus, a review of government conduct is not necessary to decide the representation
point in Cascade's case. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
00 Cf. 386 U.S. at 136. See note 57 supra.
01886 U.S. at 141-42.
02 See note 42 supra.
03 Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 157 (1967)
(dissenting opinion); Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961).
81 386 U.S. at 186.
0 See Flynn, A Survey of Injunctive Relief Under State and Federal Antitrust Laws,
1967 UTAH L. REv. 344, 349 & nA3; BNA ANrrnusT & T ADE REG. REP. B-1 (April 18,
1967).
60 It has been argued that the Court rejected the bad faith standard in El Paso and,
instead, required only an in-fact showing of inadequate representation. Note, 53 IowA
L. REv. 219, 225 (1967). The Court does not specifically discuss the standard used to
determine inadequate representation, and the government conduct in El Paso can
arguably be encompassed within the strict bad faith rule. Utilization of an in-fact
standard, however, presents several problems. In the first instance, it can be applied
only after the litigation or negotiation has been substantially completed. Such belated
application is often wasteful and productive of delay. See 386 U.S. at 156 (dissenting
opinion). Furthermore, the administrative problems caused by the application of this
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There is some question, however, whether the majority's approach
to the representation requirement reflected a sufficient appreciation of
the nature of Cascade's interest in the El Paso litigation. It could
be argued that Cascade's primary interest was in protecting its own
supply of natural gas and, only secondarily, in vindicating gas compe-
tition within California. Viewed in this manner, Cascade's private
interest did not necessarily coincide with the "public" interest, and
formal recognition of the distributor's interest in the proceedings
should not depend upon the quality of governmental prosecution. 07
The representation requirement of new rule 24 (a) (2) denies inter-
vention only where the potential intervenor is adequately repre-
sented by an existing party.08 Thus, participation in the litigation
criterion seemingly conflict with the purpose of the rule 24 requirement that applica-
tion for intervention be "timely." See note 4 supra. See also United States v. Blue
Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432, 436-38 (C.D. Cal. 1967). The in-fact standard also
places the courts in a position of second-guessing the Justice Department in the
latter's pursuit of the public interest. No standards exist to aid in this endeavor,
and it seems somewhat inappropriate for the courts to supervise strictly the policy
decisions of the executive branch in the antitrust area. For these reasons, the Supreme
Court has recognized the broad discretion of the Attorney General to conduct and
settle cases. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331-32 (1928). It has been
admitted that the potential intervenor's burden of proof would be heavy under an
in-fact standard of inadequate representation. Note, 53 IowA L. REv. 219, 226 (1967).
Indeed, even if the courts were to embrace an in-fact standard, it seems unlikely that
the criterion could be met in the absence of conduct reasonably classifiable as "bad
faith." Two recent cases, wherein the court reviewed government conduct, summarily
found the conduct to be proper. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 41
F.R.D. 342 (E.D. Mo.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Lupton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 388
U.S. 457 (1967); United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., supra. Of course, the admin-
istrative problems mentioned above are also attendant to utilization of the bad faith
standard, though the limited nature of this standard makes its application less
difficult. If possible, the propriety of intervention should be determined during the
initial stages of the litigation. In some cases at least, by concentrating upon the
nature of the intervenor's interest, the court could determine the representation ques-
tion prior to the entry of a decree without violating the spirit of the new rule. See
notes 67-70 infra and accompanying text.
o¢Presumably, the public interest is to remedy effectively the antitrust violation.
The mere formulation of an "effective" decree, however, will not necessarily protect
an interest like that of Cascade in the present case, for a decree which restored compe-
tition within California might fail to assure the needed supply of gas to Cascade. Of
course, the court will usually have some discretion in fashioning, or approving, the
details of the needed remedy. Cf. Comment, Divestiture of Illegally Held Assets, 64
MicH. L. REv. 1574, 1591 (1966); Comment, 32 FoRDHmM L. Rxv. 135, 142 (1963). There
is little reason to presume that the Government will urge that formulation which
gives maximum protection to the private interest. This is particularly true in the
consent decree context where the Government, in negotiating a remedy, must consider
problems such as difficulty of proof, uncertainty of outcome, and allocation of resources
which would arise upon litigation. See Letter from D. F. Turner to Rep. E. Celler,
Mar. 17, 1967, in BNA ANTrTRUST & TADE RE. REIP. X-1, X-2 (March 21, 1967).
08 See note 4 supra.
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should be allowed where the representation may be inadequate. 69
Within the El Paso context, it can be argued that since Cascade's
interest might be considered as belonging to a different class than
that represented by the Government,7 ° the necessary degree of doubt
existed as to whether the Government would vigorously protect that
company's existing and future gas supply.
If the appropriate test of representation is resolved by examining
the public/private "nature" of the proposed intervenor's interest,
some expansion in the number of successful intervenors in govern-
ment antitrust actions can be anticipated. The increase, however,
would probably not be dramatic because of the necessity of satis-
fying the other prerequisites of the new rule. Courts have in the
past, however, articulated two policy reasons, aside from the formal
requirements of the rule itself, as barriers to any increase in the
frequency of intervention by private parties in public antitrust
actions. First, it has been asserted that Congress has clearly mani-
fested its desire to separate public and private interests by providing
for a dual system of antitrust enforcement.71 Secondly, it has been
noted that intervention by private parties in government antitrust
actions would substantially complicate the prosecution of these
suits. 72 With regard to the first objection, the new rule denies inter-
00 Under the old rule, intervention was occasionally granted when the court decided
that the potential intervenor might be inadequately represented. See Kozak v. Wells,
278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros., 249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir.
1957).
7 Cf. First Congregational Church v. Evangelical & Reformed Church, 21 F.R.D.
325 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
71 The dissenters in El Paso contended that "intervention must be denied because
Congress has carefully provided separate statutory procedures for private and public
antitrust litigation." 386 U.S. at 148. They then cited the following provisions of
the United States Code to substantiate their position: 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15, 15a, 25, 26, 28
& 29. Section 4 empowers the Attorney General to enforce violations of the Act; § 15
allows any person to sue for a violation of the Act and recover threefold damages; § 15a
permits the United States to sue when it is injured by a violation of the Act; § 25 pro-
vides for the restraining of violations by the Attorney General; § 26 empowers any
person or corporation to sue for injunctive relief against violations of the Act; § 28
allows the Attorney General to expedite cases of general public importance; and § 29
states that in every civil action in which the United States is a complainant, appeal lies
only to the Supreme Court. Courts have seized upon this dual statutory system as
justification for denying private parties intervention in government litigation. See, e.g.,
Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 866 U.S. 683 (1961); United States v. General
Elec. Co., 95 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.J. 1950); United States v. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc.,
10 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
7 Intervention has frequently been denied because of a fear of prolonging a type
of litigation which is, by its nature, complex. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963); United
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vention where the intervenor's ability to protect his interest would
not be substantially impaired.7 In an antitrust context, the practi-
cal availability of adequate private relief would be persuasive against
intervention.7 4 However, even in those cases where no practical
private remedy is available, congressional failure to provide an
explicit private remedy should not be interpreted as a desire to leave
a party remediless in asserting his interest.
Increased intervention by private litigants in government anti-
trust proceedings could present a number of administrative prob-
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 41 F.R.D. 342 (E.D. Mo.), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Lupton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 388 U.S. 457 (1967). Furthermore, courts have
asserted that the presence of private parties would hamper the Government in its
control of the litigation, and hence damage the effectiveness of the public prosecution.
See United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, 11 F.R.D. 511, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
73 See note 4 supra.
74 It has been suggested that an adverse government decree will always substantially
disadvantage the private litigant in a later private action. Note, 53 IowA L. REv. 219,
226 (1967). Where the Government fails to win a litigated judgment, or accepts a
consent decree in settlement of the case, a private party will be handicapped in a later
treble damage suit since he will be denied the opportunity of utilizing a prior govern-
ment judgment under § 5 (a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (a) (1964). See note 81
infra. Furthermore, a private litigant primarily interested in injunctive relief may have
difficulty expanding a prior government injunction or consent decree. See Sam Fox
Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 694 (1961). Total de-emphasis of the
private remedy in the intervention context may, however, give rise to difficulties. If
that portion of the new rule which requires substantial impairment of alternative
remedies is automatically satisfied in antitrust litigation, the attention of the courts
will tend to focus upon the representation aspects of the new rule. In an effort to
avoid second-guessing governmental conduct and to limit the availability of inter-
vention, the courts may retreat to a restrictive, mechanical approach to the representa-
tion question similar to the old "bad faith" rule. Where a private party is primarily
concerned with obtaining damages for past violations, the private remedy should be
considered adequate and intervention denied. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp
Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967). Also, where the potential intervenor claims
that a proposed government injunction or consent decree is inadequate to prevent
existing or future violations, intervention should ordinarily be disallowed on the
ground that the existing private injunctive remedy is sufficient to supplement the
government action should the threatened harm materialize. See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 387, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v. Radio Corp. of Ameri-
ca, 3 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Del. 1933). On the other hand, private remedies to modify di-
vestiture decrees are presently limited. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. Also,
where a party is complaining of threatened injury due to a proposed government injunc-
tion or consent decree which is allegedly over-inclusive, utilization of the private injunc-
tive remedy is restricted. See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., supra at 393, citing
Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961). The "balanced"
approach to the impairment problem exemplified above would allow courts to view
the representation question without fear of sanctioning widespread intervention in
public antitrust actions. Maintaining the courts' ability to weigh each of the require-




lems.7" In the first instance, the scope of these problems could be
mitigated by restricting intervention to the decree-formulating stage
of the litigation, or, where a consent decree is involved, to the
period after the decree has been filed with the court.76 Allowing
appropriate private parties to intervene at the decree-formulating
stage would not present substantial difficulties for governmental
prosecutions. Government control over the litigation aimed at
establishing the violation would be unhampered. Furthermore,
since the structuring of a decree is the final responsibility of the
court,17 no government remedial prerogative could be usurped by
7r The addition of intervening parties to the litigation may result in a significant
increase in the volume of testimony, exhibits, and arguments. See Allen Calculators,
Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 (1944) (permissive intervention); ci.
Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 972
(D. Mass. 1943) (permissive intervention). Furthermore, all intervenors, once inter-
vention has been allowed, have the right to appeal any interlocutory and final orders
which affect them. 4 MooRE 24.15, at 103. These possibilities for delay acquire added
significance in the antitrust area since such actions are inherently complicated and pro-
tracted in the first instance. See Marcus, The Big Antitrust Case in the Trial Courts,
37 IND. L.J. 51 (1961); Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States
Judges, 23 F.R.D. 319 (1958).
7 Limiting intervention to litigative stages would preserve governmental control
over the initial establishment of a violation and would vindicate those sections of the
Clayton and Sherman Acts which explicitly require that suits brought by the Govern-
ment for injunctive relief be under the direction of the Attorney General. Sherman
Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1964); Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964). Furthermore, the
broad discovery powers of the Government perhaps render it best qualified to prosecute
infractions. See generally Siegel, The Antitrust Civil Process Act: the Attorney Gen-
eral's Pre-Action Key to Company Files, 10 VILL. L. Rv. 413 (1965). Though the
majority opinion in El Paso does not discuss the possibility of limiting intervention
to the remedial stages of litigation, the dissenting opinion impliedly recognizes that
such limitation would mitigate many of the administrative problems posed by inter-
vention. 386 U.S. at 152.
Presently, consent decrees are filed in court with a stipulation which gives the Gov-
ernment an unqualified right to withdraw its consent within thirty days. Letter
from D. F. Turner to Rep. E. Celler, Mar. 17, 1967, in BNA ANTITRusT & TRADE
Rim. REP. X-1, X-2 (March 21, 1967). Limiting intervention with respect to consent
decrees to the period subsequent to filing appears necessary to preserve this method
of antitrust enforcement. Defendants are apparently unwilling to negotiate when
third parties are present. See A. GOLDBERG, THE CONsENT DECRE: ITS FoRMLAnTIoN
AND USE 68-69 (1962). Consent decrees obtained by the Government cannot be used as
prima facie evidence by parties in private actions under § 5 (a) of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 16 (a) (1964). See note 81 infra. This exemption has been interpreted as indi-
cating a congressional desire to encourage the consent mechanism. See Burbank
v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964); Simco Sales Serv. v. Air Reduction
Co., 213 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp.
366 (D. Minn. 1939). There is little reason to fear a flood of private intervenors in
any particular antitrust action. Once a private party is allowed to intervene, other
hopeful private intervenors would have to demonstrate inadequate representation
by the then-existing private party.
77 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 322-23 (1961);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 89 (1950).
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the intervenors. Of course, formal participation by non-public
parties might increase the probability of appeal. Consequently, the
Government would be forced to assume additional litigative burdens.
However, this would not seem to be a significant problem since
divestiture decrees are often appealed even in the absence of inter-
vention.78
The traditional "administrative burden" argument against inter-
vention is more persuasive in the consent decree context, even as-
suming intervention is limited to the period after the negotiated
decree has been filed with the court. Allowing private opposition to
negotiated decrees might tend to undercut this method of antitrust
enforcement. Since the intervenor would presumably have the
right to present evidence and to appeal the final decision of the
court, both consenting parties-the Government and the defendant-
would be forced to undertake some of the burdens of litigation which
would otherwise have been avoided.79 This prospect alone may
make companies hesitant to enter consent negotiations. Even when
a decree has been filed, the Government might still be led into full-
scale litigation if the defendant chose, in the face of intervention,
to withdraw his consent or if the trial court found the proposed decree
lacking in some respect.80
Other considerations, however, cast doubt upon the proposition
that intervention would substantially undercut the consent mecha-
nism. Besides seeking to avoid the burdens of litigation, corporate
parties often prefer to negotiate consent settlements in order to
escape the impact of section 5 (a) of the Clayton Act.81  This con-
sideration would presumably remain important despite the possi-
bility, or actuality, of intervention, and would militate against a
decision to refrain from consent negotiations or to withdraw consent
at some later time. And, unless it is assumed that many consent
78 E.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
70 Letter from D.F. Turner to Rep. E. Celler, Mar. 17, 1967, in BNA ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. X-l, X-2 to X-3 (March 21, 1967).
s0 Id.
8115 U.S.C. § 16 (a) (1964). Section 5 (a) provides that a final judgment obtained
by the Government in an antitrust action may be introduced as prima facie evidence
against the same defendant in later private litigation. However, a proviso exempts
consent decrees from the scope of the section. Id. Since most successful private
actions are based upon prior judgments obtained by the Government, substantial moti-
vation exists for a defendant in a public action to avoid the impact of § 5 (a) by utiliza-
tion of the consent mechanism. See Comment, Consent Decrees and the Private Action:
An Antitrust Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 627, 627-28 (1965).
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decrees are dearly defective, an intervenor would likely find it
difficult to upset the negotiated settlement. Allowance of non-
public intervention does not, of course, compel recognition of all
conflicting private objections. A potential intervenor would still
have to demonstrate an adequate private interest and a lack of
alternative methods for protecting that interest.
El Paso apparently lends support to the view that a court should
consider the economic and procedural consequences of a decree upon
the applicant seeking intervention, and should grant intervention
where the applicant would be "substantially affected in a practical
sense." Yet, because of the antitrust context of the decision, any
observations concerning its impact upon future interpretation of new
rule 24 (a) (2) are necessarily speculative. The assertion that El
Paso will produce widespread intervention in public antitrust actions
is negated if a potential intervenor must show bad faith or mal-
feasance on the part of the Government in its conduct of the litiga-
tion or negotiations. Perhaps government conduct is an inappropri-
ate standard by which to judge adequacy of representation when the
applicant is asserting a strong, individualized private interest. While
rejection of a fault-finding orientation would increase the frequency
of intervention in government antitrust actions, the increase would
be limited and would not pose overwhelming administrative prob-
lems. Aside from protecting legitimate third party interests, such
intervention could assist the court in finding the most efficient
remedy. Furthermore, the possibility of even limited intervention
would tend to make the Government more considerate of affected
non-public interests in the antitrust area.
